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Biases in International Portfolio Allocation and Investor Protection Standards 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Economic reasoning suggests that financial globalization that encourages optimal international 
portfolio investments should improve investor protection standards (IPS) of a country. In 
practice, however, investors manifest varying degrees of suboptimal international portfolio 
allocations. Using a panel dataset covering 44 countries spanning over 15 years we examine 
whether suboptimal equity portfolio allocation in part is associated with the cross-country 
variations in IPS. Consistent with economic reasoning we find robust indications that 
international portfolio allocation may play an important role in the development of IPS. More 
specifically, the quality of IPS improves with higher degrees of optimal international equity 
portfolio allocation of domestic and foreign investors. 
 
 
 
 
JEL classification: G11, G18, G38,  
Key words: financial globalization; investor protection standards; equity home bias; equity 
foreign bias. 
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1. Introduction 
Economic conjecture notes that financial globalization affects the factor productivity of 
a country by promoting better corporate governance and signalling a higher quality of state 
governance (Henry, 2000)1. Pursuing financial globalization, i.e. encouraging optimal 
international portfolio allocations that integrates local with world capital markets may thus 
have a lasting effect on the improvement of investor protection standards (IPS)2. With respect 
to what should be the optimal portfolio allocations, finance theory suggests that investors 
should hold the world market portfolio to optimise their expected utilities (see Chan et al., 
2005). However, studies note that both domestic and foreign investors substantially deviate 
from holding optimal international portfolios (see, for example, Lau et al., 2010). Such 
deviations are referred to as home and foreign biases in international portfolio allocations. 
Home bias refers to the phenomenon in which domestic investors over-invest in the home 
market relative to the theoretical conjecture, thus leaving a significantly lower share of the 
FRXQWU\¶Vinvestable assets to foreign investors. On the other hand, foreign bias indicates that 
foreign investors tend to either over or underweight foreign markets relative to implied 
benchmarks (see Cooper et al., 2015 for an excellent review).  While substantial evidence exists 
on why home and foreign biases exist, much less is known about the implications of such 
biases. In this study we investigate whether the puzzle of home and foreign bias carries any 
consequences for the differing states of IPS observed across the world. 
Empirical evidence concludes that the prevalence of home and foreign biases explains 
the degree of international integration/segmentation of the domestic equity markets vis-à-vis 
the world capital markets (see Janakiramanan, 1986; Lau et al., 2010). This suggests that higher 
home bias reflects a lower degree of financial globalization, while higher foreign bias implies 
                                                          
1
 As argued by La Porta et al. (1997) it is axiomatic that standards of investor protection regulations and practices 
are pivotal for the welfare of corporates and countries. 
2
 Bonaglia et al. (2001) also argue that allowing optimal foreign portfolio investments should improve the quality 
of IPS. 
4 
 
a higher degree of financial globalization (see Lau et al., 2010 for a theoretical analysis). 
Consequently, greater home bias implies a relatively closed and less integrated economy with 
a lower presence of foreign investors. Alternatively, in a relatively open and financially 
integrated market economy, higher foreign bias signifies a greater presence of foreign 
investors. Since varying degrees of home and foreign biases reflect varying depths of foreign 
portfolio investments, studies document several channels through which foreign investors may 
influence corporate and state governance practices.  
With respect to corporate governance Kang and Kim (2010) note that foreign investors 
particularly institutional investors play an influential role in domestic governance practices by 
employing various governance tactics. Such disciplinary methods may take the form of hostile 
takeover threats, proxy contests, expressing opposition to or attempting to amend anti-takeover 
provisions3, initiating efforts to seek representation on the target boards, threatening the 
replacement of top executives and demanding asset downsizing. Likewise, Boubakri et al. 
(2005) note that foreign ownership could lead to improvements in the post-privatization 
performance of newly privatized firms because foreign investors normally demand high 
information disclosure standards, inject funds into newly privatized firms and, for the sake of 
their reputation, maintain stern control of managers¶DFWLRQ .KRHWDO¶V (2009) theoretical 
framework argues that foreign investors, particularly those from countries with better investor 
protection institutions, become valuable inside monitors as the laws of their home countries 
restrict their ability to consume private benefits made by other insiders. On the empirical front, 
using data on China¶s split-share structure reform, Huang and Zhu (2015) show that involving 
foreign institutional investors in corporate governance practices can significantly lower the 
possibility of expropriation by the controlling shareholders in emerging markets. 
                                                          
3
 For example, in 2005 7KH&KLOGUHQ¶V,QYHVWPHQW)XQG (TCI), a UK-based hedge fund which had a major share 
of the German Deutsche Börse forced the management to stop a takeover of the London Exchange which led to 
the resignation of both the chief executives (Economist, 2008). 
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With reference to the standard of state governance, economists remark that competition 
for foreign financial resources compels policymakers to reform the state and corporate 
governance practices4 (see Errunza, 2001). With respect to state governance, Stulz (2005) 
argues that financial globalization makes it difficult for the state itself to expropriate investors 
as it risks losing the much needed foreign investments if it does not heed the demands of foreign 
investors5. Similar sentiments are echoed by Rajan and Zingales (2003) who conjecture that 
competition for financial resources becomes stronger when foreign investors become involved 
in the domestic economy. As a result, the growing interest of foreign investors drives reform6 
in the domestic investor protection regulations (see Rajan and Zingales, 2000). For example, 
UHVSRQGLQJWRIRUHLJQLQYHVWRUV¶SUHVVXUHGRPHVWLFUHJXODWRry bodies signal their intention to 
improve the quality of governance through the adoption of international accounting standards.  
Errunza (2001) also posits that with their increasing interest, foreign investors demand the 
formulation and observance of regulations, which compels corporates to disseminate timely 
and relevant information to the investor fraternity. Using data from emerging markets, Huang 
and Zhu (2015) show that the flow of foreign institutional investors help promote the market-
based princiSOHRIFRUSRUDWHJRYHUQDQFHWKXVUHGXFLQJWKH³WZLQDJHQF\´SUREOHPassociated 
with VWDWHUXOHU¶VGLVFUHWLRQ 
                                                          
4
 For example, in 2007 Japan implemented the Financial Instruments and Exchange Law, which amended or 
abolished many laws that regulated foreign securities firms and was intentionally based on the 8.¶V)LQDQFLDO 
6HUYLFHV$XWKRULW\¶s framework (Report by Herbert Smith, 2008 on Contemporary issues facing financial services 
institutions in Asia, http://documents.lexology.com/cd07ed3a-b7d3-4b63-ab50-bcffa0e01dc1.pdf) 
5 TCI initiated legal action against the Indian government under the provisions of bilateral investment treaties 
between India and UK over the under-pricing of coal by Coal India Limited, in which TCI holds a 1% stake (see: 
http://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/tci-starts-legal-action-against-indian-govt-under-uk-
cyprus-treaties-112032900095_1.html). 
6 Demand from foreign investors may also lead to withdrawal/deferment of reforms. For example, in March 2012 
India announced the imposition of controversial general anti-avoidance rules (GAAR) on transactions made by 
foreign investors, without much clarity, to be effective from 1 April 2012. Foreign portfolio investors demanded 
immediate reversal of the reform. After intense pressure from foreign institutional investors, India deferred the 
introduction of GAAR until April 2013 and after further negotiations it was postponed until 2016 (Source: 
Financial Times, 7 May 2012 and 3 September 2012) 
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The above discussion convincingly underlines the importance of foreign investments 
for the development of corporate and state governance.  Since a higher level of home (foreign) 
bias refers to a lower (greater) presence of foreign investors, in this study we hypothesize that 
a greater degree of home (foreign) bias should be related to a lower (higher) quality of IPS. As 
noted earlier, a vast body of literature is devoted to explaining the causes of home and foreign 
biases7. However, studies investigating the implications of home and foreign biases is highly 
limited.  More importantly, to the best of our knowledge, there is no study that examines the 
implications of home and foreign biases on the quality of IPS. Using a sample of 44 countries 
over the period from 2001-2015 and running a series of robustness checks, including the use 
of a shock-based approach, our study reports the following two important findings.  
First, the results suggest that suboptimal international portfolio allocations of domestic 
and foreign investors may play a critical role in improving the quality of IPS. Specifically, 
markets where investors observe a higher degree of home bias (i.e. lower presence of foreign 
investors) are associated with poor quality of corporate and state IPS. Similarly, relative to 
more closed markets (lower foreign bias), countries that allow/attract greater foreign portfolio 
investments (greater foreign bias) are related a higher level of IPS. These findings hold after 
carefully accounting for several other possible determinants of IPS and for the potential reverse 
causality arising from the possibility that improvement in investor protection may cause a 
higher presence of foreign investors. In summary, the results support the view that financial 
globalization that encourages optimal international portfolio investments may carry significant 
implications for the development of corporate and state IPS. 
Second, consistent with the findings reported by Chan et al. (2005), our results show 
that the developed markets generally exhibit a lower level of home bias compared to emerging 
markets. We also find that most developed countries experience stronger positive foreign bias, 
                                                          
7
 See Cooper et al. (2015) for an extensive survey on the causes of home and foreign biases. 
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i.e. these countries are preferred by international investors compared to the emerging markets. 
However, we further contribute to this strand of literature by providing new evidence of biases 
in the cross-country asset allocations made by sophisticated global fund managers who are 
ideally expected to achieve optimal global diversification. This evidence uncovers that the 
manifestation of investment biases is not only observed in the aggregate and macro data, which 
may include singly country or  regional funds, but also in the investment behaviour of the most 
sophisticated global fund managers. 
Our study adds to two different strands of literature.  First, and as noted above, to the 
best of our knowledge, this is the first study to examine the effect of suboptimal international 
portfolio allocation on the quality of IPS. Our study is remotely related to Lau et al. (2010) 
who also demonstrate the implications of home and foreign biases. However, their focus is on 
the level of cost of capital, whereas our study examines the influence of home and foreign 
biases on the quality of IPS. Few studies that investigate the determinants of investor protection 
are focused on the role of economic openness, not on financial openness.  For example, Islam 
and Montenegro (2002) demonstrate that trade openness is positively associated with 
institutional quality but they do not investigate the effect of financial openness. Similarly, 
Busse and Gröning (2009) also demonstrate the importance of trade liberalization on good 
governance practices but, again, do not account for financial openness.  
Second, the results of our study also add to the growing debate which states that the 
impact of international diversification and consequent risk sharing benefits should not be 
limited to cost of capital and growth responses (Kose et al., 2010). Rather, the beneficial results 
should be examined through the influence of financial globalization on factor productivity, 
such as improvement of micro and macro institutional quality, including corporate and state 
governance. 
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The remaining structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 
3 presents and discusses the empirical results, and section 4 concludes the paper.  
 
2. Data 
In this section we first describe the four different country-level IPS measures, followed 
by the description of home and foreign bias measures (i.e. measures of suboptimal international 
diversification). Finally, following the literature we briefly discuss the control variables 
included in our analyses. 
 
2.1. Proxies of Investor Protection Standards 
In their seminal paper La Porta et al. (1997) emphasize the importance of institutions 
and the legal environment in protecting the interests of minority shareholders. They note that 
the quality of country level IPS is highly correlated with the protection offered to corporate 
investors, particularly to minority shareholders. La Porta et al. (1999) define good governance 
as one that protects property rights of economic agents, keeps regulations light, is clean, and 
democratic. Good governance relates to safeguarding the property rights by formulating 
effective law, facilitating a conducive environment of contract enforcement and refraining from 
expropriation. As such, our study employs four measures of IPS capturing the quality and 
practice of the different dimensions of firm and country level investor protection rights.  
 
2.1.1.  Firm-level Corporate Governance Measure 
The first investor protection measure we use is the composite index representing the 
firm-level corporate governance (Firm_Gov). We obtain the data from two different sources. 
For the developed markets we secure the dataset from Aggarwal et al. (2011).  This measure 
reflects firm level IPS that specifically captures the governance standards of firms across 23 
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countries8 for the period 2003-2008. For each firm in each country9 RiskMetrics database 
gathers information on governance attributes from firms¶ annual reports, regulatory filings, and 
their websites. Aggarwal et al. (2011) use this dataset and examine 41 firm-level governance 
attributes common to both U.S. and non-U.S. firms. The attributes cover four broad 
subcategories: (1) Board (24 attributes), (2) Audit (three attributes), (3) Anti-takeover 
provisions (six attributes), and (4) Compensation and ownership (eight attributes). A value of 
one is assigned to each attribute if the firm meets the minimally acceptable standard and zero 
otherwise. The index is then expressed as a percentage. For example, if a firm satisfies the 
entire 41 attributes standard, then it receives a score of 100%.   
 For the 21 emerging markets, we obtain similar firm level rating data from Alliance 
Bernstein Capital Emerging Market Universe (ABCEMU). ABCEMU includes a firm in their 
database if the firm is a constituent of domestic stock market indexes compiled by a major 
index provider of the country, primarily Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI), 
comprising 70-85% of the market capitalization. The rating assigned to each firm is based on 
a set of 58 questions with the score being a binary answer to yes or no. The survey is completed 
by specialist analysts domiciled in the same region/country. The questionnaires are based on 
seven different attributes comprising different weights.10 The attributes are: information 
disclosure (7%), management access and fair disclosure (11%), accounting (12%), value 
creation (22%), board and shareholder structure (22%), capital management and ethics (13%) 
and social responsibility and other (13%).  We aggregate the firm level data for the developed 
and emerging markets and rescale them on 0-100% to generate country level ratings. 
                                                          
8
 The 23 countries included are all developed markets; Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, 
Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
9 Please refer Aggarwal et al. (2011, page. 157) for details of the number of firms used for each country. 
10 See Morey et al. (2009) for further details of the index. 
10 
 
2.1.2.  Investment Profile Index 
The second measure of IPS we incorporate is referred as investment profile (Inv_file) 
index.  This country level rating index is obtained from 3ROLWLFDO 5LVN 6HUYLFHV¶ 356
International Country Risk Guide reflecting governments¶ attitude towards inward foreign 
investment (see Bekaert et al., 2007). The index ranges from 0-12, with zero reflecting the 
highest and 12 the lowest potential risks. Inv_file is determined by the 356¶Vassessment of the 
quality and enforcement standards of three different risk factors associated with foreign 
investments in the country, viz. (i) contract viability or risk of expropriation, (ii) payment 
delays, and (iii) repatriation of profits. Each subcomponent is scored on a scale of 0-4 with zero 
being the highest risk and four reflecting a very low risk. Increase in the ratings suggests 
progress in the establishment and enforcement of regulations related to foreign investments. 
For ease of interpretation and comparability with other measures, we re-scale this index on 
scale of 0-100. 
 
2.1.3.  Strength of Investor Protection Index 
The third measure of IPS that we use is sourced from the World Bank Doing Business 
(WBDB) database, known as the Strength of Investor Protection Index (SIPI_WBDB),  
developed by Djankov et al. (2008) covering the period from 2006-2015.11  SIPI_WBDB 
captures the extent to which minority shareholders are protected against expropriation by 
FRUSRUDWHLQVLGHUVSDUWLFXODUO\DJDLQVWGLUHFWRUV¶PLVDSSURSULDWLRQRIa ILUP¶VDVVHWVIRUWKHLU
own private benefit. The value of the index ranges from 0-10 with higher values signalling 
better corporate IPS. The index is constructed on the basis of information obtained from a 
survey of lawyers, judges, engineers, corporate and public officials in 190 countries. The 
computations are thus based on security related regulations, company laws, civil procedure 
                                                          
11
 The database is only available from 2006. 
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codes, and court rules of evidence. The index value ranging from 0-10 is estimated using a 
simple average of the percentile rankings of its three subcomponent indicators representing 
three different dimensions of corporate IPS, all measured on a scale of 0-10 rating.  
The first of the three dimensions of SIPI_WBDB relates to the transparency of related-
party transactions, referred to as the Extent of Disclosure Index (0-10).  Higher rating 
designates greater transparency in related-party transactions executed by corporate insiders and 
signifies better IPS. The second dimension of SIPI_WBDB LVEDVHGRQGLUHFWRUV¶OLDELOLW\IRU
self-dealing, termed as the Extent of Director Liability Index (0-10). Higher rating suggests a 
higher degree of rights granted to minority shareholders to account for directors/insiders being 
liable in the case of related-party transactions WKDWPD\VWULSWKHILUP¶VDVVHWV,WVSHFLILFDOO\
captures the extent to which the minority shareholders have legal remedial courses to ensure 
that corporate insiders pay for damages caused to the firm, repay the profit claimed by the 
minority shareholders from successful transactions, fine and imprison in the case of theft, and 
directly sue directors for the damage the transactions may cause to the company. The third and 
final component of SIPI_WBDB is stated as Ease of Shareholder Suits Index (0-10) with higher 
values demonstrating greater powers accorded to shareholders to challenge the related-party 
transactions made by the insiders. It specifically reveals the extent to which shareholders have 
direct access to a FRPSDQ\¶VLQWHUQDOGRFXPHQWVDQGPDNHXVHRIWKHJRYHUQPHQWLQVSHFWRUV
without filing suits in court. It further reflects the degree to which documents and information 
are available to the plaintiff shareholder in the case of a legal trial. For further details on the 
methodology used in the construction of the SIPI_WBDB index and its components and sub-
components, refer to Djankov et al. (2008). For ease of comparison, we normalize the 
SIPI_WBDB factor on a scale of 0-100. 
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2.1.4.  Country-level Institutional Measure of IPS 
Finally, the fourth alternative measure of IPS we use is a country level institutional 
quality indicator (ALT_WBGI) constructed by Kaufmann et al. (2010) and maintained by the 
World Governance Indicators (WGI) database of the World Bank. WGI produces six country 
level composite ratings/indicators, each reflecting broad dimensions of institutional quality and 
observance. These indicators are rated from 0-100 with 100 being the least risky and zero the 
most risky. The six indexes include Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence 
of Violence/Terrorism, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and 
Control of Corruption. Although other institutional measures of IPS are available, such as from 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), Economic Intelligence Unit etc., the WGI are 
averaged ratings based on several hundred variables sourced from 31 different data sources.12 
Governance indicators from several sources serve as perfect proxies as they cover much larger 
concepts of institutional quality. Kaufmann et al. (2010) demonstrate that using the composite 
measures based on averaged information from a vast number of sources significantly lowers 
the degree of measurement error relative to other IPS indicators available from individual 
sources.  
For the purpose of this study we employ the four most relevant governance indicators 
capturing the standard and practice of the quality of the investor protection environment in 
different countries, i.e. Government effectiveness, Control of corruption, Regulatory quality 
and Rule of law.  Following Brunetti and Weder (2003), the IPS measures we use in the study 
are continuous variables by virtue of averaging three years of an ordered variable which takes 
values ranging from 0-100. The underlying information from 31 different sources includes 
governance perceptions reported by survey respondents, non-governmental organizations, 
commercial business information providers, and public sector organizations worldwide. For 
                                                          
12 Please refer appendix A for the different information sources used by WGI. 
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detailed methodology on the construction, refer to Kaufmann et al. (2010). The WGI dataset is 
widely used in existing studies, primarily in investigating cross-country governance and the 
association between governance and growth (see, Kaufmann and Kraay, 2003). 
 
2.2. Measures of Home and Foreign Biases 
We employ two datasets to measure home and foreign biases exhibited by equity 
portfolio investors. First, the standard aggregate cross-country dataset of equity portfolio 
holding (in USD millions) is obtained from the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey 
(CPIS) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The CPIS gathers data on stocks of cross-
border holdings of equities for 76 participating countries.13  We use the annual cross-country 
portfolio holdings data for the period 2001-2015 to construct measures of equity home bias 
(CPIS_HB) and equity foreign bias (CPIS_FB) as described below. Dictated by the availability 
of the data, 44 out of the 45 countries listed in the highly investable MSCI All Country Index 
are included in our analysis.  
Second, we employ distinctive fund level country allocation data from Emerging 
Portfolio Fund Research (EPFR) to construct the foreign bias (GF_FB) manifested by global 
fund managers14. EPFR avails asset allocation data on traditional and alternative funds 
domiciled globally. 7KHVHJOREDOIXQGVDUHPDQDJHGE\ZRUOG¶VODUJHVWDQGPRVWVRSKLVWLFDWHG
investment companies such as Blackrock, Templeton, Morgan Stanley etc. The sole purpose 
of these funds is to have optimal global allocations across all the investable global assets. We 
use the annual average (using monthly allocations) country allocations of 122 global equity 
funds for the period from 2001-2015. The size of all funds when combined is approximately 
                                                          
13 For detailed descriptions of this dataset see Bekaert and Wang (2010). 
14 Given the granularity of the EPFR database, it has been employed by several studies (see Gelos and Wei, 2005; 
and Jotikasthira et al., 2012). However, as the funds are domiciled only in 13 countries, we are unable to construct 
efficient measures of home bias due to the smaller number of observations for our empirical analysis.  
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US$120 billion and is domiciled across nine countries. As these are global funds with the sole 
purpose of global allocations, we expect the foreign bias to be lower compared to the CPIS 
aggregate data which include various types of funds (undisclosed) and different investment 
styles.  
Finally, for the benchmark we employ the total country level market capitalization 
figures of S&P/IFC from the World Development Indicator (WDI) of the World Bank Further, 
we also use the MSCI investible market capitalization to construct the free float benchmark. 
We describe the measures of home and foreign biases in the sub-sections immediately below. 
 
2.2.1. Equity Home Bias 
Equity home bias (EHB) refers to the degree to which domestic investors over-allocate 
their investable funds to the domestic equity market relative to the international capital asset 
pricing model (ICAPM) benchmark. Following Chan et al. (2005) we define equity home bias 
as in equation (1). 
In equation (1) ௝ܹ௝௧ (defined in equation 2) UHSUHVHQWVGRPHVWLFLQYHVWRUV¶ZHLJKWLQJVLQWKH
domestic market capitalization of country j at time t. 
௝݄௝௧  is the stockholdings of investors in their home market j and ܶܲܪ௝௧ is the total portfolio 
holdings (domestic and foreign) of all investors domiciled in country j at time t. CPIS reports 
the bilateral foreign equity portfolio holdings, with no investments in  the domestic market, for 
each host country j. Following Fidora et al. (2007) we construct domestic holdings ( ௝݄௝௧) and 
total portfolio holdings of domestic investors (ܶܲܪ௝௧) as in equation (3). 
 
ܧܪܤ௝௧ ൌ ݈݋݃ ቆ ௝ܹ௝௧௝ܹ௧כ ቇ (1)  
 ௝ܹ௝௧ ൌ ௝݄௝௧ܶܲܪ௝௧  (2)  
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In equation (3) ܯܥܽ݌௝௧ is the domestic market capitalization of country j at time t and ܨܲܪ௜௝௧ǡ௜ஷ௝ is the equity holding in country j by foreign investors domiciled in country݅. Thus, ܶܲܪ௝௧ is defined as in equation (4) 
ܨܲܪ௝௜௧ is foreign securities (i) held by investors domiciled in country j at time tǤ ௝ܹ௧כ  is the 
ICAPM world benchmark allocation for country j for the time t, which is the same for all 
investors in all countries and is defined in equation (5). 
A zero value of ܧܪܤ௝௧ in Equation (1) indicates that portfolio investors do not manifest any 
bias towards their home market relative to the ICAPM benchmark, while a positive value 
indicates the presence of home bias. As the ܧܪܤ௝௧ is constructed using CPIS data, we denote 
it by CPIS_HB in further analysis. 
 
2.2.2. Equity Foreign Bias 
Relative to the suggestion of ICAPM, equity foreign bias implies a disproportionate 
investment of investors domiciled in country ݅ on the securities of firms based in country j.  
Mishra (2015) and Cooper et al. (2017) provide alternative methods in calculating equity home 
and foreign bias. Cooper et al. (2017) particularly highlight problems associated with the log-
ratio scale measure which has been used in previous studies (see Chan et al., 2005; Lau et al., 
2010). Following existing studies, the equity foreign bias measure using the freely floated 
market capitalization adjusted method is shown in equation 6 (see Cooper et al., 2017; 
Dahlquist et al., 2003; Kho et al., 2009; Mishra and Ratti, 2013).  
 ௝݄௝௧  =  ܯܥܽ݌௝௧ ±  ? ܨܲܪ௜௝௧ǡ௜ஷ௝ସଷ௜ୀଵ  (3)  
 ܶܲܪ௝௧ ൌ ௝݄௝௧ ൅ ෍ ܨܲܪ௝௜௧ǡ௝ஷ௜ସଷ௞ୀଵ  (4)  
 ௝ܹ௧כ ൌ ܯܥܽ݌௝௧ ? ܯܥܽ݌௝௧ସସ௝ୀଵ  (5)  
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where ௜ܹ௝௧ (defined in equation 7) is the investment allocation of investors domiciled in 
country݅  on equities issued by firms based in country j at time t.  
In equations (7) ݄௜௝௧ denotes country݅¶VLQYHVWRUV¶HTXLW\holdings in country݆ at time t. All 
the 44 countries in our sample data received foreign equity investment, so݄௜௝௧ ്  ?. ௜ܹ௝௧ is 
constructed using the cross-country holding data of CPIS and the EPFR data directly provides 
the weightings. Hence, there are two proxies of foreign bias.  ܨ ௝ܹ௧כ  (in equation 8) is the ICAPM free float or investible benchmark allocation for 
country j for time t and is defined in equation (8).  
ܨܯܥܽ݌௝௧ is the free float domestic market capitalization of country݆ at time t available to 
foreign investors ݅. We calculate ܨ ௝ܹ௧כ  XVLQJ D FRXQWU\¶V IUHH IORDW PDUNHW FDSLWDOLzation 
available to all investors15. The use of free float market capitalization helps us to avoid scaling 
and transforming issues that could be encountered when using log-ratio in the construction of 
foreign bias. 
Following Bekaert and Wang (2009) we normalized equity foreign bias measure to 
ensure that the values lie between -1 and 1 as presented in Equation 9 and 10. 
                                                          
15 We use MSCI investable market capitalization that is available to all investors, thus avoiding scaling issues in 
the construction of foreign bias, as in some countries not all equities are freely floated for investments by foreign 
investors (see Dahlquist et al., 2003). 
 
ܧܨܤ௜௝௧ ൌ ௜ܹ௝௧ െ  ܨ ௝ܹ௧כ  (6)  
 ௜ܹ௝௧ ൌ ݄௜௝௧ ? ݄௜௝௧ସସ௝ୀଵ ݅ ് ݆ (7)  
 
ܨ ௝ܹ௧כ ൌ ܨܯܥܽ݌௝௧ ? ܨܯܥܽ݌௝௧ସସ௝ୀଵ  (8)  
 
ܨ ௝ܹ௧כ െ ௜ܹ௝௧ܨ ௝ܹ௧כ െ  ? ܹ݄݁݊ ௜ܹ௝௧ ൑ ܨ ௝ܹ௧כ ሺݑ݊݀݁ݎ݅݊ݒ݁ݏݐ݉݁݊ݐሻ (9)  
 
െ ቆ ௜ܹ௝௧ െ ܨ ௝ܹ௧כ ? െ ܨ ௝ܹ௧כ ቇ ܹ݄݁݊ ௜ܹ௝௧ ൐ ܨ ௝ܹ௧כ ሺ݋ݒ݁ݎ݅݊ݒ݁ݏݐ݉݁݊ݐሻ (10) 
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In extreme cases, ܧܨܤ௜௝௧ is 1 if investors domiciled in country݅ hold no equities issued by 
firms based in country j and -1 if investors domiciled in country݅ invest all equities issued by 
firms based in country j except for its own equities. In our analysis we take the rescaled value 
of the average equity foreign bias (ܣܧܨܤ௝௧) exhibited by all source country investors (L «Q) 
for country j for each time t as shown in equation (11). 
We rescale ܣܧܨܤ௝௧ to  ? െ ܣܧܨܤ௝௧ for the sake of comparability and accessible 
interpretation. This now indicates that value of one is no foreign bias, value greater than one 
higher investments relative to the benchmark and value less than one lower investments relative 
to the benchmark. Thus, we should now expect positive relationship between foreign bias and 
investor protection measures. In subsequent analysis the measure of foreign bias based on 
CPIS-IMF data is referred to as ܥܲܫܵ ?ܨܤ DQGWKHPHDVXUHEDVHGRQ(3)5*OREDO)XQGV¶GDta 
is denoted byܩܨ ?ܨܤ. 
 
2.3.  Control Variables 
We control for a number of factors that are likely to drive the quality of investor 
protection standard for a given country. These include SUHYLRXV\HDU¶VPDUNHWreturn (Retn_1), 
market capitalization to GDP ratio (MGDP), turnover ratio (Turn), inflation rate (Infl), trade 
openness (LSMI), valuation effect (Tobinq), press freedom (Press), political stability (PolStab), 
and GDP per capita (GDPPC). Brief justification for each control variable is discussed below.  
First, Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) argue that governance depends on past firm 
performance, which if persistent, implies that governance and firm performance are linked 
endogenously via their common dependence on past firm performance. To account for such an 
effect we include one year lagged stock returns (Retn_1). Retn_1
 
is calculated as the previous 
 
 ? െ ܣܧܨܤ௝௧ ൌ ෍ ܧܨܤ௡௜ୀଵ ݅ ് ݆ (11)  
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\HDU¶Vaverage of monthly returns using MSCI total return index. Second, Rajan and Zingales 
(1998) show that financial development is positively related to the standard of investor 
protection. We account the role of financial development by using the ratio of equity market 
capitalization to GDP (MGDP) reflecting the level of stock market development relative to the 
size of the economy. Third, we incorporate the effect of market liquidity by including the 
turnover ratio (TURN) defined as the ratio of total value of stocks traded to market 
capitalization. We obtain both the stock market development data from WDI.  
Fourth, we control for inflation (Infl) to ensure that our analysis is not driven by 
variations in macroeconomic reforms which may further drive regulatory reforms. We expect 
inflation to be negatively associated with IPS. Annual inflation rates of each country are 
sourced from WDI.  
Fifth, Rajan and Zingales (2003) also provide both theoretical and empirical evidence 
confirming the association between trade openness and institutional development.16 To capture 
the effects of trade openness and integration on investor protection, we include the log values 
RIDFRXQWU\¶VH[SRUWVDQGLPSRUWVVFDOHGE\*'3LSMI) as a control variable. Data required 
to estimate trade openness are obtained from WDI.  
Sixth, we employ Tobinq to capture the effect of valuation on investor protection. It is 
conceivable that countries enjoying higher stock market valuations have a good governance 
system, which reduces the risk and cost of capital. La Porta et al. (2002) provide evidence of a 
positive association between higher valuations of firms and strong investor protection.  The 
country level Tobinq PHDVXUHLVFRQVWUXFWHGE\WDNLQJWKHUDWLRRIHDFKFRXQWU\¶VFRQVWLWXHQt 
ILUPV¶WRWDOOLDELOLWLHVSOXVHTXLW\PDUNHWYDOXHWRWKHERRNYDOXHVRIWKHILUPV¶DVVHWV 
We employ a press freedom (Press) index controlling the influence of free media and 
free access to information on the development of investor protection standard. Busse and 
                                                          
16 Also, see Laffont DQG1¶*XHVVDQ(1999) for the impact of trade openness on corruption. 
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Gröning (2008) show that countries that allow adequate press freedom have better investor 
protection and less corruption. A free media with access to information enhances checks and 
balances on both companies and government activities. Press freedom index takes a value of 0 
(lowest degree of press freedom) and 100 (highest degree of press freedom). We expect press 
freedom to be positively associated with investor protection. We obtain data on press freedom 
from WGI and use the subcomponents of voice and accountability.  
A measure of political stability (PolStab) is used to capture the level of stability in a 
country. Countries that are politically stable and free from internal/external conflicts are 
expected to have institutions that can enhance the quality of governance and provide better 
investor protection.  We use PolStab to capture the effect of a stable government on investor 
protection. We obtained the political stability rating index (0-100) from WGI, the higher value 
of the index reflecting higher stability.  Finally, countries that have a high income level have 
enough financial resources to establish strong institutions and hold government accountable to 
provide better investor protection. As such, following Bris and Cabolis (2004) we use GDP per 
capita (GDPPC) to capture the effect of wealth and economic development on IPS. The data 
are obtained from WDI.  
 
3.  Empirical Analysis 
In this section we report and discuss the results of empirical estimations testing the 
proposition: whether varying degrees of home and foreign biases in international equity 
portfolio allocations influence the quality IPS. We begin with a brief examination of the cross-
country summary analysis of key variables, followed by a discussion of multivariate regression 
estimations. 
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3.1. Cross-sectional Summary 
Our sample includes 23 developed and 21 emerging markets, as classified by MSCI, 
for the period from 2001-201517. Table 1 reports the overall average values of the key variables 
of each country. As seen and expected, the figures of Panel A (columns 2-5) show that 
developed markets tend to exhibit a higher quality of IPS relative to emerging markets.  For 
example, against the firm-level governance (Firm_Gov) measure, Canada ranks topmost 
among the top ranked countries, followed by the United States, Switzerland, Finland, Ireland, 
the Netherlands, Australia, Israel, New Zealand and France. However, countries that rank in 
the bottom 10 are generally emerging markets: Egypt, Indonesia, the Philippines, Romania, 
Brazil, Russia, Turkey, South Africa, China and Argentina. A similar pattern is observed in the 
other measures of IPS. The statistics in panel B show that the average quality of IPS (all four 
measures) is significantly higher for developed markets compared to their emerging markets¶ 
counterpart. 
«««,QVHUW7DEOHDERXWKHUH 
The average figures of home bias i.e. CPIS_HB, (Panel A, column 6) show that the top 
ten countries with the lowest home bias are mostly developed countries (except China) with 
the United States being number one (least biased) followed by the United Kingdom, Japan, the 
Netherlands, Germany, France, Ireland, Canada, and Italy. Similarly to the case of IPS, 
countries that display the highest degree of home bias are predominantly emerging markets, 
led by Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Peru, the Czech Republic, the Philippines, Egypt, 
Argentina, Poland, and Indonesia. The MSCI investable used foreign bias, figures (i.e. 
CPIS_FB, column 7) illustrate that the developed countries generally occupy the top ten 
positions. These countries include Ireland, Germany, France, Netherlands, Italy, Japan, 
                                                          
17
 IPS data cover the following periods: Firm_Gov 2003-2008, SIPI_WBDB 2006-2015; Inv_file and ALT_WBGI 
2001-2015.   
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Belgium, Australia, Hong Kong, and United Kingdom. Generally, developed countries are 
preferred by international investors compared to emerging markets.  GF_FB, a measure of 
foreign bias exhibited by the global funds, also suggests a similar pattern (column 8). Although 
the global funds are expected to be managed by the most sophisticated managers and hold 
globally diversified portfolios, the data reveal foreign biases in their investments.  
The univariate anecdotal evidence presented above suggests that countries that have 
investors manifesting lower home bias and attracting more foreign investors are associated with 
better standards of investor protection. This is also reflected in the analysis when all the 
countries are grouped into developed and emerging markets. Panel B (Table 1) shows that the 
differences in all three measures of biases (i.e. CPIS_HB, CPIS_FB and GF_FB) between the 
developed and emerging markets are statistically significant, indicating that the developed 
countries experience lower home and higher foreign biases respectively.18 The estimates 
reported in Panel C (Table 1) further support the conjecture that higher (lower) home (foreign) 
bias may be negatively related to the quality of IPS. The difference in average home bias 
(CPIS_HB) of the top and bottom ten countries, as two different groups, is -4.30. Similarly, 
both measures of foreign biases also indicate substantial differences between the two groups. 
The differences in all four measures of IPS also reveal similar patterns, indicating that the 
countries with lower (higher) home (foreign) biases are characterised by better IPS.  
The country level average values of control variables, presented in Table 2, demonstrate 
that developed markets, relative to emerging markets, have a lower historical return (Ret_1), 
higher liquidity & higher turnover ratio (Turn), more developed stock markets (MGDP), better 
integration with world economy (LSMI), higher stock market valuation (Tobinq), better 
                                                          
18
 CPIS_HB (3.38-5.88=-2.5), CPIS_FB (1.0031-0.9967 =0.0064) and GF_FB (1.0083-0.9859 =0.0024). All 
differences are statistically significant at 5%. 
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political stability (PolStab) with lower risk of potential internal and external conflict, and 
greater independence of press freedom (Press).
 
«««,QVHUW7DEOHDERXWKHUH 
3.2. Bivariate Correlation Analysis 
Table 3 reports the correlation coefficient matrix between all the variables employed in 
our analysis. Consistent with expectations, the equity home bias measure is negatively 
correlated with all the four measures of IPS. This suggests that countries that experience 
overinvestment in the local stock market by domestic investors are associated with 
experiencing poor IPS. Similarly, the two foreign bias measures are positively correlated with 
the IPS measures, which imply that a higher presence of foreign investors is positively related 
to higher IPS in the host countries. With regard to the control variables, most of them carry 
expected signs. 
«««,QVHUW7DEOHDERXWKHUH 
 
3.3. Multivariate Regression 
The cross-country summary and correlation analyses discussed in the previous section 
signify that countries that are characterised with lower home bias seems to be associated with 
superior IPS. However, whether cross-sectional and temporal variations in home and foreign 
biases exhibited by equity portfolio investors, in part, may explain the differences in cross-
country IPS, after accounting for the possible factors, remains to be tested. In this section we 
address this by using country level panel data regressions controlling for country and year fixed 
effects. We run the regressions using first difference  ?ܫܲ ௝ܵ௧and  ?ܵ ܲܣ௝௧ to mitigate the 
potential issues of any trend/non-stationarity concerns. More specifically, the following general 
specification (10) is estimated. 
 
 ?ܫܲ ௝ܵ௧ ൌ ߙ ൅  ߚଵǤ  ?ܵ ܲܣ௝௧ ൅ ߚଶǤ  ?ܥݐ݈ݏ௝௧ ൅ ߚଷǤ ܶܨܧ௧ ൅ ߚସǤ ܥܨܧ௝ ൅ ௝߳௧ (12)  
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In equation (10)  ?ܫܲ ௝ܵ௧ represents the first difference of one of the four measures of  ?ܫܲ ௝ܵ௧ 
(i.e. Firm_Gov, Inv_file, SIPI_WBDB, and ALT_WBGI), one at a time, of country j at time t.  
SPA LV D YHFWRU RI HVWLPDWHV RI VXERSWLPDO SRUWIROLR DOORFDWLRQV LH ELDVHV LQ LQYHVWRUV¶
portfolios: CPIS_HB, CPIS_FB and GF_FB), regressed one at a time.  ܥݐ݈ݏ௝௧ is a vector of the 
control variables of country ݆ at time ݐ. TFE and CFE are time (year) and country fixed effects 
respectively.19 Throughout the analysis, all coefficients are estimated based on double clustered 
standard errors, the clustering done at the country and year level (Petersen, 2009). All the 
coefficients are reported as partial elasticity and the t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. As 
there are three different measures of SPA and four factors of IPS, we run three set of regressions 
(reported in Tables 4-6), estimating four equations (one for each measure of IPS).  
 
3.3.1. Investor Protection Standards and Equity Home Bias 
This section discusses the regression results of the effect of home bias (CPIS_HB) on 
the four different measures of IPS (one at a time) as shown in equation (13). The key 
explanatory variable of interest in all four specifications (one for each measure of IPS) is home 
bias (ܥܲܫܵ ?ܪܤሻof country ݆ in year ݐ.  
The results of the four regressions (one for each measure of IPS) are reported in Table 
4. As evident throughout the four specifications (models 1 - 4), the coefficients of CPIS_HB 
enter the regressions with the expected negative sign and are statistically significant. This 
evidence offers a strong indication of the view that home bias (i.e. the over allocation of 
portfolio investment in local stock markets) is negatively related to the quality of IPS of a 
country. These results are consistent with the theoretical assumption of Errunza (2001) who 
                                                          
19
 For the sake of brevity we do not report the estimates of year and country fixed effects. 
 
 ?ܫܲ ௝ܵ௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵǤ  ?ܥܲܫܵ ?ܪܤ௝௧ ൅ ߚଶǤ  ?ܥݐ݈ݏ௝௧ ൅ ߚଷǤ ܶܨܧ௧ ൅ ߚସǤ ܥܨܧ௝ ൅ ௝߳௧ (13)  
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conjectures that the manifestation of higher home bias restricts foreign LQYHVWRUV¶ presence 
which, in turn, prevents the possibility of foreign investors exporting good IPS practices to the 
host country. 
«««,QVHUW7DEOH4 about here.............. 
 
In terms of economic implications, the coefficients indicate20 that ceteris paribus, a one 
percentage decrease in home bias measure, on average, increases the Firm_Gov by 0.37% 
(model 1), Inv_file by 0.50% (model 2), SIPI_WBDB by 0.55% (model 3), and ALT_WBGI by 
0.58% (model 4). The goodness of fit measure (adjusted R2) reported for all four models ranges 
from 46%-57%, suggesting a good statistical fit of all the four specifications. These results 
provide strong support to our hypothesis, i.e. a reduction in home bias observed by domestic 
investors may lead to improvement in the quality of IPS. As noted earlier these effects may 
take place through the influence of foreign investors¶ monitoring effects, and these seeming 
associations are consistent with the predictions of existing literature (see Errunza, 2001; Huang 
and Zhu, 2015; Rajan and Zingales, 2000; Stulz, 2005). 
 
3.3.2. Investor Protection Standards and Empirical Foreign Bias 
Next, we replace the home bias measures with the proxy of foreign bias, as specified in 
equation (14). In this set of analyses the key explanatory variable of interest is a measure of 
foreign bias (ܥܲܫܵ ?ܨܤ௝௧) of country ݆ in yearݐ. The specifications also include all control 
variables, time fixed effectsሺܶܨܧ௧) and country fixed effects (ܥܨܧ௝). The estimates of all four 
specifications are reported in Table 5. 
                                                          
20 As with any observational empirical investigation, all our estimates in this study are also based on the regular 
assumption of exogeneity and limited to the sample period we use. Thus, economic interpretation needs to be 
exercised with due caution. Despite the fact that it is very challenging to fully mitigate the issue of endogeneity, 
our study does provide strong evidence of the relationship. However, we undertake robustness checks to address 
endogeneity later in this section. 
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Consistent with the economic justifications developed earlier, the estimated coefficient 
of CPIS_FB is positive and statistically significant in all the four models. The coefficient of 
0.379 CPIS_FB in model (1) of Table 5 suggests a positive association between the firm-level 
governance of a country and portfolio allocation of foreign investors. Similarly, models 2, 3 
and 4 also exhibit the positive effect of CPIS_FB on measures of IPS. These results offer strong 
support to the economic conjecture that countries that attract higher level foreign equity 
portfolio investments, relative to the implied benchmark, are associated with higher levels of 
corporate governance and regulatory quality, i.e. superior IPS. The findings are also consistent 
with the implications of the literature discussed earlier (see Errunza, 2001; Stulz, 2005). 
«««,QVHUW7DEOH5 about here.............. 
 
3.3.3. Investor Protection Standards and Global Fund Foreign Bias  
Table 6 reports the estimates of Equation (15) in which the key variable of interest is 
GF_FB, a measure of foreign bias in the portfolio of global equity funds of EPFR. As in earlier 
specifications, all control variables discussed are incorporated, including year 
effectsሺܶܨܧ௧ሻǡand country fixed effects (ܥܨܧ௝) are also controlled for.  
 
Similarly to the results reported in Table 5, the expected positive and statistical 
significance of the coefficient of GF_FB (in all four models) implies that the biases observed, 
even in the international portfolio allocation of global funds, also have important implications 
for the IPS of host countries. These findings are consistent with the economic justification of 
 
 ?ܫܲ ௝ܵ௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵǤ  ?ܥܲܫܵ ?ܨܤ௝௧ ൅ ߚଶǤ  ?ܥݐ݈ݏ௝௧ ൅ ߚଷǤ ܶܨܧ௧ ൅ ߚସǤ ܥܨܧ௝ ൅ ௝߳௧ (14)  
 
 ?ܫܲ ௃ܵ௧ ൌ ߙ ൅  ߚଵǤ  ?ܩܨ ?ܨܤ௝௧ ൅ ߚଶǤ  ?ܥݐ݈ݏ௝௧ ൅ ߚଷǤ ܶܨܧ௧ ൅ ߚସǤ ܥܨܧ௝ ൅ ௝߳௧ (15)  
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Errunza (2001) who notes that foreign investors from well governed countries21 not only 
demand better governance but also export good governance from the source countries.  
«««,QVHUW7DEOH6 about here.............. 
 
Overall, the results discussed in Tables 4-6 confirm the views that the presence of 
foreign investors can help improve the quality and standard of investor protection in host 
countries. Consequently, countries with higher home bias suffer from poor governance quality. 
On the other hand, countries that are favoured by foreign investors experience improvements 
in the quality of IPS. 
 
3.3.4. Results of Control Variables 
The coefficients of control variables reported in Tables 4-6 generally bear the expected 
signs and are statistically significant. Turn, LMSI, Tobinq, and GDPPC are positive and 
statistically significant.  These results are consistent with the findings reported in existing 
studies (see, for example, La Porta et al., 2002; Lau et al., 2010; Rajan and Zingales, 2003). 
Infl is inversely related to investor protection and is generally statistically significant across the 
specifications. Similarly, PolStab, and Press are positively associated with investor protection 
but their statistical significance levels are sensitive to alternative specifications. The 
coefficients of other control variables, such as lagged return (Retn_1) and stock market 
development (MGDP), are also dependent on the specification of equations, suggesting that 
they lack a systematic effect on IPS. Not surprisingly, such instability in the role of control 
variables is also reported by earlier studies such as Lau et al. (2010) and Gelos and Wei (2005). 
 
                                                          
21 The countries included are: the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, France, Denmark, 
Switzerland, Luxembourg, Finland, Singapore, Norway, Australia and Austria. 
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3.4. Robustness Checks 
The results discussed above provide strong evidence that suboptimal international 
portfolio allocations, i.e. home and foreign biases, seem to have implications for DFRXQWU\¶V
IPS. In this section we present additional tests to validate the robustness of empirical results. 
We also address the concern of endogeneity (particularly reverse causality) by examining the 
relation between IPS and international portfolio allocation using a dynamic Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM) panel estimation and an exogenous shock based method linked 
to the recent 2010 European sovereign debt crisis. The results are reported in Table 7.22 
«««,QVHUW7DEOH7 about here.............. 
 
3.4.1. Dynamic GMM Estimation 
Although the incorporation of lagged explanatory variables may mitigate the concerns 
of endogeneity to a certain extent, it may not be enough. We further address this issue by 
employing the dynamic GMM estimation. Following Hoechle et al. (2012) and Wintoki et al. 
(2012) we include the first difference of IPS as an internally generated instrumental variable to 
estimate the first difference dynamic GMM regression (see Arellano and Bover, 1995, for 
further details of the method). The dynamic GMM estimation is suitable when the time span is 
smaller and the cross-section of observations is larger. Since our panel dataset includes 15 years 
of annual observations (time series) for 44 sample countries (cross-section) the dynamic GMM 
method is empirically appropriate. The model is specified in Equation (16): 
where IPS is a measure of investor protection standards (one of the four measures of IPS is 
regressed at a time),  ? ௝ܺ௧ିଵ represents the instrumented suboptimal equity portfolio variables 
                                                          
22
 For brevity, we do not report the coefficients of control variables but these are available upon request. 
 
 ?ܫܲ ௝ܵ௧ ൌ ܽ ൅ ߚଵ ?ܫܲ ௝ܵ௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଶ ? ௝ܺ௧ିଵ ൅ ߛ ? ௝ܼ௧ିଵ ൅ ௝߳௧ (16)  
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(i.e. a measure of bias in international portfolio allocation) and ௝ܼ௧ିଵ represents the control 
variables identified earlier. 
Panel B (Table 7) reports the coefficients of  ? ௝ܺ௧ିଵ (ߚଶ) and associated over-
identification test results. The coefficients of home and foreign biases are statistically 
significant with expected signs in all specifications. Thus, the dynamic GMM estimation 
further adds support to the economic conjecture and our key findings discussed earlier that the 
SUHYDOHQFHRIKRPHELDV LQHTXLW\ LQYHVWRUV¶SRUWIROLRdeteriorates IPS in the home country 
whilst higher foreign bias plays a positive role in improving IPS. 
 
3.4.2 Shock Based Test 
We further employ a shock based quasi-experiment to separate the exogenous effects of 
suboptimal allocation by equity investors on IPS. We exploit the exogenous shock created by 
the 2010 Eurozone sovereign debt crisis that led to severe stress in the European markets, 
particularly for the Eurozone countries. De Grauwe and Ji (2013) show that the crisis affected 
some Eurozone countries more than others. For instance, in our sample five countries, i.e. 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain (GIIPS) suffered a greater decline in their stock 
markets compared to other euro (non-GIIPS) countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany and the Netherlands). Since size of the stock market is related to home and foreign 
bias measures, we observe the changes in the average measure of suboptimal equity allocations 
(i.e. home and foreign biases) for the GIIPS and non-GIIPS Eurozone countries. 
In Figures 1 and 2 we plot the average CPIS based home and foreign bias measures for 
the GIIPS and for the rest of non-GIIPS Eurozone countries. The figures show that, since the 
onset of the crisis (2010) the level of home bias in GIIPS countries amplified significantly more 
than that in non-GIIPS Eurozone countries. In unison, foreign bias significantly diminished in 
the GIIPS countries compared to non-GIIPS Eurozone countries. Undoubtedly, the trends of 
29 
 
home and foreign biases of the GIIPS and non-GIIPS Eurozone were varyingly but 
exogenously affected by the sovereign debt crisis. The pattern of home and foreign biases, with 
respect to the crisis of 2010, depicted in Figures 1 and 2, offers an ideal set-up to examine 
whether the differential changes caused by the exogenous crisis led to any causal implications 
on the level of IPS for GIIPS, relative to non-GIIPS Eurozone countries.  
«««,QVHUW)LJXUHDERXWKHUH 
«««,QVHUW)LJXUHDERXWKHUH 
 
We use something similar to the difference-in-differences method to examine the effects 
of home and foreign biases on IPS. To this end we first generated a dummy variable (
୲ሻ that 
takes the value of one for the GIIPS countries (treated group), and zero for the non-GIIPS 
Eurozone countries (the control group). Second, a post-crisis year dummy (ୡ୰୧ୱ୧ୱሻ to 
represent the crisis shock from 2011 onwards is also created. Finally, an interactive variable ൫
୲ ൈ ୡ୰୧ୱ୧ୱ ൈ ܵܲܣ݆ݐ൯is generated and introduced in Equation (17).  
 
 
In specification (17) ܫܲ ௝ܵ௧ is one of the four measures of IPS discussed earlier and the 
coefficient of interest is ȕ3. A statistically significant ȕ3, with expected sign (i.e. negative in the 
case of home bias and positive in the case of foreign bias) should provide a strong indication 
that changes in IPS of GIIPS and non-GIIPS Eurozone countries are differently affected by the 
exogenous changes in home and foreign biases driven by the 2010 European sovereign debt 
crisis.  
The statistical significance and expected signs of ߚଷ coefficients for all four regressions, 
as reported in Table 7 (panel B), support the view that an increase in home bias seems to 
ZHDNHQDFRXQWU\¶VIPS. However, a rise in equity foreign bias has a positive impact on country 
level IPS. These shock based results offer a robust indication that suboptimal international 
 ܫܲ ௝ܵ௧ ൌ ܽ ൅ ߚଵܩ௧ ൅ ߚଶܲ݋ݏݐ௖௥௜௦௜௦ ൅ ߚଷ൫ܩ௧ ൈ ܲ݋ݏݐ௖௥௜௦௜௦ ൈ ܵܲܣ௝௧ିଵ൯ ൅ ߚସܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௝௧ିଵ ൅ ௝߳௧ (17) 
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diversifications by domestic and foreign investors have important implications for the 
development of IPS. 
 
4.  Conclusions 
In spite of extensive evidence on what causes home and foreign biases in international 
equity portfolio allocation, studies investigating their implications are highly limited. 
Economic reasoning implies that financial globalization that promotes optimal international 
portfolio allocations should help improve the standard of investor protection in host countries. 
In a financially open economy domestic and foreign investors should hold optimum levels of 
equities compatible with the ICAPM benchmark. However, defying the normative suggestions 
equity investors exhibit different degrees of home and foreign bias in their international 
portfolio allocation.  
This is the first study to empirically examine whether the widely documented home and 
foreign biases in international portfolio allocation have any implication for investor protection 
standards (IPS). We examine this issue by analysing a sample of 44 countries spanning 15 
years. Consistent with economic justifications, the results suggest that biases in international 
portfolio allocation carry important implications for the development of IPS. We find that the 
markets characterised with a higher degree of home bias are associated with poor corporate 
and state IPS. Similarly, countries that allow for greater participation of foreign portfolio 
investors (i.e. greater foreign bias) have superior IPS. More specifically, our findings suggest 
that the quality of IPS in a country improves as domestic and foreign investors undertake 
optimal international equity portfolio investment. In summary, our findings support the 
economic conjecture that an optimal financial globalization, as prescribed by the ICAPM, can 
have a significant positive effect on the IPS of a country.  
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Table 1 
Country level averages of Key Variables of Interest 
 
This table presents the averages of the four measures of investor protection standards (ܫܲ ௝ܵ௧) and three measures of 
biases (home and foreign) in international equity portfolio investments for the sample period. Panel A reports the time 
series averages of each variable for each sample country; averages of developed versus emerging markets using Morgan 
Stanley Capital Investment classification are presented in Panel B; and averages of the top and bottom ten countries 
ranked by the CPIS-based measure of home bias (CPIS_HB) are presented in Panel C. Firm_Gov is firm-level corporate 
governance indexes (column 2); Inv_file is investment profile (column 3); SIPI_WBDB is strength of Investor Protection 
Index (column 4); and ALT_WBGI is an alternative country level investor protection measure from World Bank 
Governance Indicators (column 5). All IPS measures are on a scale of 0-100 with higher values indicating higher 
standards of investor protection and governance. CPIS_HB (column 6) measures equity home bias calculated as the log 
(natural) value of the share of domestic investors in their own country¶s stock market capitalization (j) relative to the 
country¶s world market capitalization weight (column 6); CPIS_FB is the IMF-CPIS based equity foreign bias measure 
computed using the world-market-based free float adjusted method by subtracting the average of foreign allocations 
from foreign investors domiciled in country ݅ investing in equities of country j (݅ ് ݆ሻሻ from the MSCI investable 
benchmark allocation for country j (column 7), and GF_FB is also an equity foreign bias measure constructed using 
(3)5¶VPLFURJOREDOIXQGOHYHOGDWD(column 8).  
 
Panel A 
Col 1         Col 2           Col 3      Col 4    Col 5       Col 6        Col 7  Col 8   
Country Firm_Gov   (0-100) 
Inv_file SIPI_WBDB ALT_WBGI 
CPIS_HB CPIS_FB GF_FB  (0-12) (0-10) (0-100) 
Argentina 25.8 6.49 4.56 34.4 6.25 0.9996 0.9993 
Australia 51.4 10.14 5.72 95.1 3.78 1.0123 1.0024 
Austria 45.2 8.34 5.14 97.9 4.75 1.0162 1.0036 
Belgium 37.1 7.25 6.91 88.6 3.62 1.0213 1.0052 
Brazil 24.6 8.32 5.36 43.8 4.44 0.9992 0.9929 
Bulgaria 26.7 7.27 5.08 51.9 9.25 0.9998 0.9933 
Canada 71.1 7.51 8.23 95.2 3.16 1.0006 1.0028 
Chile 35.8 7.32 5.07 87.9 5.56 1.0004 0.9995 
China 25.6 6.61 4.86 41.5 3.32 0.9885 0.9922 
Czech Rep 37.5 7.32 5.04 76.2 6.97 1.0005 0.9964 
Denmark 44.9 7.42 6.21 98.6 4.83 1.0007 1.0024 
Egypt 21.5 6.65 3.73 51.8 6.58 1.0002 0.9868 
Finland 53.3 8.69 5.68 99.5 4.96 1.0036 0.9993 
France 46.3 9.13 5.82 90.6 2.91 1.0464 1.0611 
Germany 45.7 7.63 5.1 93.2 2.88 1.0572 1.0704 
Greece 30.2 6.53 3.63 74.2 5.81 1.0027 0.9987 
Hong Kong 45.4 8.26 8.87 87.9 3.56 1.0147 1.0215 
Hungary 39.2 6.27 4.36 77.7 7.39 0.9996 0.9924 
India 28.3 7.2 4.92 56.9 4.39 0.9958 0.9917 
Indonesia 22.9 5.86 4.87 25.9 6.13 0.9984 0.9785 
Ireland 53.1 7.73 8.19 93.2 3.05 1.0586 1.0763 
Israel 49.4 8.18 8.17 78.5 5.79 1.0002 1.0015 
Italy 44.2 7.32 6.08 67.6 3.31 1.0281 1.0364 
Japan 41.6 7.34 6.92 88.4 2.35 1.0253 1.0549 
Korea 38.2 7.19 6.13 77.8 4.33 0.9874 0.9582 
Malaysia 25.8 7.33 5.63 64.3 5.36 0.9858 0.9724 
Mexico 34.5 7.24 5.44 39.7 5.23 0.9937 0.9816 
Netherlands 52.1 9.67 5.47 95.5 2.84 1.0414 1.0627 
New Zealand 48.8 8.52 9.33 97.2 6.05 1.0012 1.0006 
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Norway 43.7 8.98 6.73 99.1 4.41 1.0138 1.0214 
Peru 27.2 5.61 5.28 30.7 7.05 0.9995 0.9848 
Philippines 23.4 6.86 4.28 39.6 6.66 0.9998 0.9684 
Poland 27.2 6.87 6.02 67.5 6.21 0.9991 0.9977 
Portugal 37.8 8.05 5.99 85.3 5.96 1.0005 1.0047 
Romania 23.4 6.39 4.98 52.1 7.98 0.9994 0.9754 
Russia 24.7 6.28 4.74 20.4 4.61 0.9936 0.9765 
South Africa 25.1 8.33 6.11 55.8 4.33 0.9947 0.9812 
Spain 45.9 7.98 5.16 85.9 3.74 1.0012 1.0075 
Sweden 46.2 10.74 5.81 97.7 3.98 1.0025 1.0192 
Switzerland 54.7 10.14 6.35 97.8 3.37 1.0091 1.0312 
Thailand 26.3 6.97 6.02 57.2 5.92 0.9977 0.9916 
Turkey 24.8 5.98 5.54 54.1 5.86 0.9984 0.9943 
United Kingdom 56.5 9.15 7.98 93.7 2.32 1.0127 1.0318 
United States 61.7 7.92 8.11 91.8 0.79 0.7017 0.6748 
 
Panel B: Averages of the Developed and Emerging Markets 
Economies Firm_Gov   
(0-100) 
Inv_file 
(0-12) 
SIPI_WBDB 
(0-10) 
ALT_WBGI 
(0-100) 
CPIS_HB CPIS_FB GF_FB 
Developed 48.1 8.37 6.59 90.95 3.38 1.0031 1.0083 
Emerging 28 6.87 5.14 52.63 5.88 0.9967 0.9859 
Difference 20.1 1.5 1.55 38.32 -2.5 0.0064 0.0224 
 
Panel C: Averages of the Top and Bottom 10 Countries against CPIS_HB  
Country Firm_Gov    Inv_file SIPI_WBDB ALT_WBGI CPIS_HB CPIS_FB GF_FB 
Top10 55.21 9.35 7.94 97.36 2.74 1.0315 1.0468 
Bottom10 
Difference 
24.18 
31.03 
6.27 
3.08 
4.49 
3.45 
37.90 
59.46 
7.04 
-4.30 
0.9637 
0.0678 
 0.9452 
0.1016 
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Table 2 
Cross-Country Averages of Control Variables  
 
This table reports the time series average of the control variables for each sample country: Retn_1 is the average MSCI index based total monthly return over 
the past year; Turn is the ratio of total value of stocks traded to market capitalization to market liquidity effects; MGDP is market capitalization scaled by GDP; 
Infl is the one year lagged rate of inflation based on the consumer price index; LSMI is market integration measured as the ratio of a country's annual exports 
plus imports divided by GDP; Tobinq is measured as the log (natural) book value of total liabilities plus market value of equity and divided by the book value 
of the corporate assets of country; PolStab is the political stability measure ranging from 0-100 with higher rating indicating greater stability; Press is the 
press freedom indicator measure ranging from 0-100 with higher rating indicating greater freedom from government interference and GDPPC is gross domestic 
product per capita. 
 
Country Retn_1 (%) Turn 
(%) 
MGDP  
(% of GDP) 
Infl (%) LSMI  
(% of GDP) 
Tobinq PolStab 
(1-100) 
Press 
(0-100) 
GDPPC 
 (in USD) 
Argentina 7.0 10.40 38.67 10.0 40.41 5.76 52.70 56.75 5918 
Australia 4.0 84.23 119.16 3.0 40.80 5.83 94.93 94.29 34705 
Austria 2.0 44.70 28.95 2.0 101.49 5.35 95.47 92.51 37845 
Belgium 1.0 44.74 65.83 3.0 153.17 5.09 93.37 93.04 36323 
Brazil 18.0 48.15 54.96 7.0 25.81 5.01 55.90 59.34 5834 
Bulgaria 9.0 18.62 17.52 5.0 116.48 5.25 58.07 64.43 4273 
Canada 3.0 75.43 114.47 2.0 70.33 5.67 96.49 96.02 35335 
Chile 13.0 15.37 107.11 4.0 69.21 0.21 85.34 78.11 8116 
China 9.0 122.53 69.07 3.0 58.66 4.18 57.24 6.96 2299 
Czech Rep 10.0 60.96 25.33 2.0 58.66 3.33 79.84 78.44 13843 
Denmark 1.0 81.36 63.31 2.0 124.87 3.72 99.62 98.75 47736 
Egypt 13.0 36.26 55.67 9.0 93.56 5.39 40.86 18.63 1639 
Finland 6.0 119.26 98.62 2.0 55.01 6.71 99.30 98.32 38092 
France 1.0 101.20 80.67 2.0 78.37 5.59 90.89 88.24 34014 
Germany 2.0 141.75 45.71 2.0 53.34 5.42 91.42 93.61 34333 
Greece 9.0 49.06 51.91 7.0 78.38 5.77 73.44 79.03 22032 
Hong Kong 1.0 77.91 421.17 2.0 362.90 3.69 93.90 58.75 27859 
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Hungary 7.0 77.24 24.53 5.0 146.36 0.92 77.38 84.89 10655 
India 11.0 115.82 68.12 7.0 39.90 2.70 54.28 59.43 830 
Indonesia 8.0 53.16 30.03 8.0 56.92 -1.81 44.54 39.16 1594 
Ireland 6.0 52.34 46.77 2.0 161.14 6.13 90.86 93.04 46103 
Israel 5.0 61.53 84.72 3.0 76.03 4.47 81.95 67.74 21799 
Italy 3.0 130.19 37.54 2.0 52.70 5.22 70.69 80.89 30279 
Japan 1.0 111.68 77.97 0.0 26.94 1.29 88.30 77.96 35857 
Korea 3.0 222.26 73.81 3.0 82.12 -0.72 82.04 68.89 16657 
Malaysia 9.0 31.36 137.03 4.0 191.51 4.98 83.08 37.26 6036 
Mexico 4.0 27.84 28.33 4.0 54.33 4.11 61.19 53.14 7959 
Netherlands 1.0 147.38 91.33 2.0 132.82 6.12 96.07 98.32 39882 
New Zealand 10.0 46.31 36.38 2.0 59.34 6.22 94.54 98.08 25219 
Norway 4.0 114.81 55.67 2.0 71.45 4.41 96.50 98.13 66658 
Peru 6.0 12.97 47.15 2.0 43.06 5.17 40.95 47.33 3319 
Philippines 8.0 18.51 48.26 5.0 89.85 2.66 53.21 49.79 1428 
Poland 4.0 37.55 28.56 3.0 75.52 4.93 69.21 78.73 8802 
Portugal 3.0 63.47 39.39 9.0 67.27 5.02 82.15 90.93 18380 
Romania 7.0 12.97 16.31 11.0 75.08 3.49 49.77 60.20 5306 
Russia 6.0 58.94 61.59 10.0 55.18 2.66 41.83 28.67 6375 
South Africa 13.0 69.52 215.23 5.0 59.34 4.84 71.08 69.42 4868 
Spain 5.0 164.33 86.72 3.0 56.87 6.00 84.61 87.09 25992 
Sweden 4.0 121.81 104.08 4.0 89.37 3.48 97.84 97.98 41035 
Switzerland 3.0 99.91 229.24 1.0 88.85 5.21 97.95 96.83 54237 
Thailand 9.0 94.00 62.06 12.0 135.01 2.96 63.68 47.16 3021 
Turkey 14.0 152.80 28.94 9.0 49.15 5.26 61.92 41.72 6991 
United Kingdom 3.0 142.71 128.47 2.0 57.08 6.04 92.84 91.74 35933 
United States 2.0 212.34 124.09 2.0 25.46 6.50 90.47 88.50 42341 
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Table 3 
3HDUVRQ¶VSDLUZLVHcorrelation coefficient between the dependent and independent variables 
 
Note: The variables labelled 1-4 are the four measures of investor protection standards (ܫܲ ௝ܵ௧) and 5-7 are the suboptimal international portfolio allocation bias measures. They 
are described in Table 1.  The other variables include Retn_1 which is the average MSCI index based on total monthly return over the past year; Turn is the ratio of total value 
of stocks traded to market capitalization to market liquidity effects; MGDP is market capitalization scaled by GDP; Infl is the one year lagged rate of inflation based on the 
consumer price index; LSMI is market integration measured as the ratio of a country's annual exports plus imports divided by GDP; Tobinq is measured as the log (natural) 
book value of total liabilities plus market value of equity and divided by the book value of corporate assets of country݅; PolStab is the political stability measure ranging from 
0-100 with higher rating indicating greater stability; Press is the press freedom indicator measure ranging from 0-100 with higher rating indicating greater freedom from 
government interference and GDPPC is gross domestic product per capita. For brevity and space, statistical significance of at least the 5% level is reported in bold.  
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
Firm_Gov  (1) 1                
Inv_file  (2) 0.36 1               
SIPI_WBDB (3) 0.44 0.43 1              
ALT_WBGI (4) 0.27 0.31 0.23 1             
CPIS_HB (5) -0.23 -0.36 -0.43 -0.42 1            
CPIS_FB (6) 0.30 0.42 0.34 0.31 -0.35 1           
GF_FB (7) 0.26 0.31 0.37 0.43 -0.36 0.34 1          
Retn_1 (8) 0.09 0.23 0.08 0.12 0.33 -0.29 -0.07 1         
Turn (9) 0.26 0.34 0.22 0.40 -0.41 -0.24 0..35 -0.36 1        
MGDP (10) 0.10 0.17 0.12 0.08 0.26 -0.21 0.15 -0.20 0.11 1       
Infl (11) -0.25 -0.10 -0.39 -0.06 0.28 -0.26 -0.08 0.20 -0.16 -0.12 1      
LSMI (12) 0.19 0.14 0.20 0.31 0.15 0.30 0.24 -0.05 -0.03 0.31 -0.14 1     
Tobinq (13) 0.11 0.28 0.31 0.10 0.22 0.19 0.24 0.05 0.03 0.11 -0.17 0.08 1    
PolStab (14) 0.10 0.13 0.08 0.18 -0.06 0.04 0.12 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.17 0.10 0.08 1   
Press (15) 0.13 0.18 0.23 0.27 -0.08 0.15 0.15 0.12 0.04 0.18 -0.02 0.08 0.09 0.08 1  
GDPPC (16) 0.17 0.28 0.22 0.06 0.21 0.43 0.42 0.21 0.42 0.24 -0.32 0.16 -0.34 0.10 0.05 1 
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Table 4 
Investor Protection Standards and CPIS based Equity Home Bias 
 
This table reports estimates of four specifications of Equation (11). In each specification the dependent 
variable is one of the four measures of investor protection (i.e. Firm_Gov, Inv_file, SIPI_WBDB and 
ALT_WBGI) as defined in the notes to Table 1. The explanatory variable of key interest is CPIS_HB, 
also defined in the notes to Table 1. All the control variables are defined in the notes to Table 2. All 
variables are used as first difference. The t-statistics, reported in parentheses, are based on double 
clustered standard errors (clustering done at the country and year levels). For tractable interpretation, 
all the coefficients are reported as elasticity and the statistical significance is reported against 10% (*), 
5% (**) and 1% (***) significance levels respectively.  
 
 Model (1) 
Firm_Gov 
Model (2) 
Inv_file 
Model (3) 
SIPI_WBDB 
Model (4) 
ALT_WBGI  ?CPIS_HB -0.369** -0.503** -0.549** -0.581*** 
 (-2.17) (-2.26) (-2.42) (-3.73)  ?Retn_1 0.323 0.684** 0.372 0.348* 
 (1.24) (2.38) (1.36) (1.65)  ?Turn 0.248** 0.256*** 0.228** 0.325*** 
 (2.81) (3.59) (2.62) (4.22)  ?MGDP 0.684 0.775** 0.762* 0.514 
 (1.42) (2.05) (1.73) (1.02)  ?Infl -0.477** -0.364 -0.689*** -0.326 
 (-2.43) (-1.16) (-3.05) (-1.13)  ?LSMI 0.376** 0.349* 0.507** 0.488*** 
 (2.27) (1.96) (2.63) (3.37)  ?Tobinq 0.223 0.482** 0.556*** 0.428 
 (1.28) (2.17) (2.81) (1.35)  ?PolStab 0.226 0.330* 0.267 0.564* 
 (1.42) (1.75) (1.23) (1.98)  ?Press 0.475** 0.618** 0.742** 0.763** 
 (2.09) (2.26) (2.39) (2.47)  ?GDPPC 0.216** 0.523*** 0.475** 0.139 
 (2.35) (2.78) (2.43) (1.24) 
Constant 0.639*** 0.817*** 0.884*** 0.289*** 
 (2.86) (4.37) (3.68) (2.52) 
Number of Observations 264 616 440 616 
Adj. R-square 0.46 0.57 0.49 0.52 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 5 
Investor Protection Standards and CPIS based Equity Foreign Bias 
 
This table reports the estimates of four specifications of equation (12). In each specification the 
dependent variable is one of the four measures of investor protection (i.e. Firm_Gov, Inv_file, 
SIPI_WBDB and ALT_WBGI) as defined in the notes to Table 1. The explanatory variable of key interest 
is CPIS_FB, also defined in the notes to Table 1. All the control variables are defined in the notes to 
Table 2. All variables are used as first difference. The t-statistics, reported in parentheses, are based on 
double clustered standard errors (clustering done at the country and year levels). For tractable 
interpretation, all the coefficients are reported as elasticity and the statistical significance is reported 
against 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) significance levels respectively.  
 
 Model (1) 
Firm_Gov 
Model (2) 
Inv_file 
Model (3) 
SIPI_WBDB 
Model (4) 
ALT_WBGI  ?CPIS_FB 0.379*** 0.534*** 0.493*** 0.597*** 
 (2.69) (2.85) (2.48) (3.73)  ?Retn_1 0.488 0.744*** 0.508 0.524* 
 (1.33) (2.77) (1.47) (1.75)  ?Turn 0.263** 0.374*** 0.346** 0.725*** 
 (2.16) (2.83) (2.42) (3.11)  ?MDGP 0.549 0.721** 0.693* 0.642 
 (1.05) (2.28) (1.62) (1.19)  ?Infl -0.514** -0.370 -0.732** -0.327 
 (-2.32) (-1.36) (-2.44) (-1.28)  ?LSMI 0.457** 0.348* 0.518** 0.537** 
 (2.18) (1.73) (2.34) (2.92)  ?Tobinq 0.377 0.672*** 0.686*** 0.358 
 (1.26) (2.93) (2.97) (1.19)  ?PolStab 0.492* 0.521* 0.422 0.576** 
 (1.88) (1.77) (1.41) (2.23)  ?Press 0.426* 0.565* 0.637** 0.689*** 
 (1.88) (1.97) (2.46) (2.64)  ?GDPPC 0.334** 0.547*** 0.480** 0.177 
 (2.13) (2.93) (2.38) (1.32) 
Constant 0.628*** 0.841*** 0.937*** 0.468*** 
 (2.75) (4.52) (3.86) (2.93) 
Number of Observations 264 616 440 616 
Adj. R-square 0.57 0.59 0.51 0.55 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 6 
Investor Protection Standards and Equity Foreign Bias of Global Fund 
 
This table reports the estimates of four specifications of equation (13). In each specification the 
dependent variable is one of the four measures of investor protection (i.e. Firm_Gov, Inv_file, 
SIPI_WBDB and ALT_WBGI) as defined in the notes to Table 1. The explanatory variable of key interest 
is GF_FB, also defined in the notes to Table 1. All the control variables are defined in the notes to Table 
2. All variables are used as first difference. The t-statistics, reported in parentheses, are based on double 
clustered standard errors (clustering done at the country and year level). The t-statistics, reported in 
parentheses, are based on double clustered standard errors (clustering done at the country and year 
level).  For tractable interpretation, all the coefficients are reported as elasticity and the statistical 
significance is reported against 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) significance levels respectively.  
 
 Model (1) 
Firm_Gov 
Model (2) 
Inv_file 
Model (3) 
SIPI_WBDB 
Model (4) 
ALT_WBGI  ?GF_FB 0.357*** 0.493*** 0.501*** 0.564*** 
 (2.51) (2.62) (2.87) (3.14)  ?Retn_1 0.432 0.652** 0.370 0.588* 
 (1.45) (2.13) (1.39) (1.79)  ?Turn 0.305** 0.429*** 0.282** 0.518*** 
 (2.47) (2.63) (2.03) (3.11)  ?MGDP 0.690 0.849** 0.791* 0.588 
 (1.36) (2.14) (1.76) (1.23)  ?Infl -0.486** -0.377 -0.502*** -0.254 
 (-2.47) (-1.40) (-2.93) (-1.07)  ?LSMI 0.464*** 0.327* 0.472*** 0.542*** 
 (2.58) (1.73) (3.09) (3.57)  ?Tobinq 0.376* 0.562*** 0.583*** 0.354 
 (1.56) (2.73) (2.98) (1.25)  ?PolStab 0.461 0.483* 0.347 0.518** 
 (1.38) (1.53) (1.22) (2.39)  ?Press 0.569** 0.718*** 0.753*** 0.796*** 
 (2.07) (2.51) (2.71) (2.83)  ?GDPPC 0.202** 0.485*** 0.492*** 0.127 
 (2.08) (2.73) (2.59) (1.14) 
Constant 0.735*** 0.793*** 0.786*** 0.343*** 
 (3.36) (3.67) (3.45) (2.76) 
Number of Observations 264 616 440 616 
Adj. R-square 0.48 0.57 0.53 0.56 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 7 
Robustness tests 
 
This table shows the results of two robustness tests. Four specifications of the models are estimated. In 
each specification the dependent variable is one of the four measures of investor protection (Firm_Gov, 
Inv_file, SIPI_WBDB, ALT_WBGI) as defined in the notes to Table 1. The explanatory variables of 
main interest in each of the four regressions are CPIS_HB, CPIS_FB, and GF_FB measures, also 
defined in the notes to Table 1. All regression specifications include control variables as defined in the 
notes to Table 2. Panel A presents the coefficients estimated using the first difference Dynamic GMM 
panel model. Panel B presents the shock based estimations, employing the 2010 sovereign debt crisis 
as the exogenous shock which affected the treatment group of GIIPS Eurozone countries (Greece, Italy, 
Ireland, Portugal and Spain) more than the control group of non-GIIPS Eurozone countries. The t-
statistics, reported in parentheses, are based on double clustered standard errors (clustering done at the 
country and year levels). For tractable interpretation, all the coefficients are reported as partial elasticity 
and the statistical significance is reported against 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) significance levels. 
 
Panel A: Dynamic GMM (Equation 14, see the text) 
 Model (1) 
Firm_Gov 
Model (2) 
Inv_file 
Model (3) 
SIPI_WBDB 
Model (4) 
ALT_WBGI  ?CPIS_HB_1 
  ?CPIS_FB_1 -0.412*** (-3.71) 0.522*** -0.569*** (-3.15) 0.689*** -0.572*** (-3.96) 0.472*** -0.625*** (-3.38) 0.597*** 
 (3.43) (4.68) (3.59) (4.44)  ?GF_FB_1 0.562*** 0.578*** 0.731*** 0.784*** 
 (3.11) (4.23) (3.78) (2.98) 
Adj. R-square  
Difference Hansen J 
statistics 
0.38 
0.37 
0.48 
0.45 
0.41 
0.28 
0.43 
0.51 
Controls including country 
and year fixed effects 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
 
Panel B: Shock Based Estimations (Equation 15, see the text) 
 Model (1) 
Firm_Gov 
Model (2) 
Inv_file 
Model (3) 
SIPI_WBDB 
Model (4) 
ALT_WBGI 
CPIS_HB -0.331***  -0.617*** -0.549*** -0.641*** 
 (4.27) (-2.93) (-3.34) (-4.46) 
CPIS_FB   0.653*** 0.714*** 0.575*** 0.632*** 
 (4.75) (3.17) (2.86) (3.49) 
GF_FB 0.596***  0.629*** 0.722*** 0.813*** 
 (4.23) (3.78) (3.47) (4.26) 
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Figure 1: Yearly home bias in non-GIIPS and GIIPS countries 
Notes: Figure 1 shows the annual average home bias measure (i.e. tendency of domestic portfolio 
investors to over or under allocate their own domestic market relative to the ICAPM benchmark) for 
the GIIPS (Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain) and non-GIIPS euro countries. The objective is 
to gauge how the GIIPS countries experienced an increase in their home bias compared to non-GIIPS 
countries during the recent 2010 European sovereign debt crisis. 
 
 
Figure 2: Yearly foreign bias in non-GIIPS and GIIPS countries 
 
 
Notes:  Figure 2 shows the annual average foreign bias (i.e. tendency of foreign portfolio investors to 
over or under allocate a non-resident country relative to the ICAPM benchmark) for the GIIPS (Greece, 
Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain) and non-GIIPS Eurozone countries. The objective is to gauge how 
the GIIPS countries suffered a decline in their foreign bias proxy compared to non-GIIPS countries 
during the recent 2010 European sovereign debt crisis. 
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Appendix 
Table A1 
Definitions of Variables 
Variable Description Data source 
Firm_Gov Firm-level corporate governance indexes Obtained data from two sources; Developed markets from 
Aggarwal et al. (2011) and emerging markets from Alliance 
Bernstein Capital Emerging Market Universe 
Inv_file Investment profile International Country Risk Guide 
SIPI_WBDB Strength of Investor Protection Index World Bank Doing Business 
ALT_WBGI Alternative country level investor protection measures  World Bank¶s World Development Indicator 
CPIS_HB Equity home bias calculated as the log (natural) value of the share of domestic 
investors in their own country's stock market capitalization (݆) relative to the country's 
world market capitalization weight 
Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) of International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) 
CPIS_FB Equity foreign bias measure using the world-market-based, free float adjusted method 
(see Dahlquist et al., 2003; Kho et al., 2009; Mishra and Ratti, 2013) 
CPIS of IMF and Morgan Stanley Capital International 
GF_FB Equity foreign bias measure using global fund data Emerging Portfolio Fund Research (EPFR) 
Retn_1 3UHYLRXV\HDU¶VDYHUDJHRIPRQWKO\UHWXUQVPHDVXUHGE\06&,WRWDOUHWXUQLQGH[ Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) 
Turn Turnover ratio measured as the ratio of total value of stocks traded to market 
capitalization 
MSCI 
MGDP Ratio of market capitalization scaled by GDP World Bank¶s World Development Indicator 
Infl Annual inflation index of a country. Annual inflation index of each country is sourced 
from WDI 
World Bank¶s World Development Indicator 
LSMI Log stock market integration measured as the ratio of a country's annual exports plus 
imports divided by GDP 
World Bank¶s World Development Indicator 
Tobinq Tobinq PHDVXUHFRQVWUXFWHGE\WDNLQJWKHUDWLRRIHDFKFRXQWU\¶VFRQVWLWXHQWILUPV¶
WRWDOOLDELOLWLHVSOXVHTXLW\PDUNHWYDOXHWRWKHERRNYDOXHVRIWKHILUPV¶DVVHWV 
Morgan Stanley Capital International and Thompson Reuters 
PolStab Political stability rating index (0-100), higher value of index reflecting higher stability Political Risk Services Group¶s ICRG 
Press Press freedom which takes a value of 0 (lowest degree of press freedom) and 100 
(highest degree of press freedom) 
Maintained by World Bank Governance Indicator - World Bank 
GDPPC Gross domestic product per capita. World Bank¶s World Development Indicator 
 
 
 
 
